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1 Introduction
The importance of job mobility for individuals’ success in the labour market is widely discussed.
The role of job changes particularly for wage growth has been extensively investigated in empirical
analyses (e.g. Topel and Ward, 1992; Light and McGarry, 1998; Neumark, 2002). Job changes within
an individual’s first years in the labour market are important, as decisions made in this period can
strongly influence longterm prospects (Topel and Ward, 1992; von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Mo¨ller
and Umkehrer, 2014).
While search and matching theories specify the wage of the current and new job as determinants
for job changes, a growing literature has demonstrated the relevance of nonwage job characteristics
(e.g. Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Sullivan and To, 2014; Bonhomme et al., 2015). Job characteristics
other than the wage such as the possibility of promotion, actual hours worked, the flexibility of
working time and other working conditions cannot be fully specified ex-ante in working contracts
but reveal only after some time. Surprisingly, few studies on job mobility have investigated the
importance of risk or uncertainty which individuals face when they decide whether or not to change
their job. The study by van den Berg (1992), for example, examines different types of costs related
to job changes such as the loss of fringe benefits, moving costs and costs with adjusting to a new
environment. But even if these costs can be entirely foreseen by the individual at the time the
decision is made, the individual’s benefits from the job change are not fully determined ex-ante. To
change one’s job therefore involves risk, and individuals evaluate the expected utility from a job
offer depending on their risk attitudes. Hence, risk-averse individuals should be less likely to change
their job, ceteris paribus, because they are less willing than risk-tolerant individuals to bear the risk
associated with a job change.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between risk attitudes, job mobility and subsequent
wage growth. We first extend the model for on-the-job search with nonwage job characteristics by
including heterogeneity in risk attitudes across individuals. Based on this theoretical framework
we empirically answer the question whether individuals who are more risk-averse change jobs less
often during early career than individuals who are more risk-tolerant. We then examine whether job
change decisions of risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals lead to different patterns of wage growth
during early career.
Taking risk aversion into account provides several explanations for differences in the relationship
between job mobility and wage growth. A reason for differences in wage growth with each job
change may be that risk-averse individuals demand greater immediate compensation in terms of
the contracted wage in the new job for the risk associated with the job change. As a result, when
risk-averse individuals actually change their job, the accompanied increase in the wage level is higher
1
than for risk-tolerant individuals. Furthermore wage growth can also be explained by the number of
job changes undertaken by risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals during early career. Fewer job
changes means an increase in tenure and risk-averse individuals might thus receive comparably higher
returns from accumulated firm-specific capital. On the other hand, the match quality of the job and
thus wage growth within the job cannot be entirely foreseen ex-ante. Risk-averse individuals who
change jobs less frequently, have fewer opportunities to learn about their own abilities and preferences
because they obtain less information with respect to their fit to different job requirements (Farber
and Gibbons, 1996; Antonovics and Golan, 2012; Papageorgiou, 2014).
Our empirical results show firstly that risk-averse individuals change jobs less often during early
career than risk-tolerant individuals. Secondly, wage gains from each job change tend to be on average
higher for risk-averse individuals which is in line with the argument that risk-averse individuals
demand higher monetary compensation with each job change. Furthermore, the difference in job
changing behaviour between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals during early career leads to
overall higher wages for risk-averse individuals. As a conclusion, our findings indicate that the
assumption of homogeneous risk attitudes commonly made in theoretical as well as empirical studies
on job mobility and wage growth can not be consistently supported.
In accordance with our two research questions this paper is related to two literature strands.
First, the analysis contributes to studies which investigate the influence of risk attitudes on labour
market decisions. This comprises of studies on the role of risk attitudes in the decision to invest in
human capital and its related returns (Shaw, 1996; Brown and Taylor, 2005; Budria et al., 2012), in
the decision to become self-employed (Caliendo et al., 2009; Fossen, 2011; Skriabikova et al., 2014)
and in sorting into occupations (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2005; Bonin et al., 2007). Second,
our study is related to literature which investigates the relationship between job mobility and wage
growth. While there is much evidence that job mobility is related to positive wage growth (e. g.
Bartel and Borjas, 1981; Topel and Ward, 1992; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005), some studies have also
found a negative relationship between job mobility and wage growth (e. g. Light and McGarry, 1998;
Neumark, 2002). We therefore contribute to this literature by investigating how the introduction of
heterogeneous risk attitudes influences the relationship between job mobility and wage growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we sketch our conceptual framework in order to
explain why risk attitudes affect job changes and how the relationship between job changes and
associated wage growth depends on the individual’s willingness to take risks. In section 3, our
empirical approach and the data are described. Section 4 presents our main findings and sensitivity
analyses. The last section provides a conclusion.
2
2 Conceptual framework
In the following, we present a theoretical model that formalises the relationship between risk attitudes
and job mobility. In the canonical on-the-job search model (Burdett, 1978; Mortensen, 1986), a
worker changes her job based on the comparison of the current wage and the offered wage of the
new job. Hwang et al. (1998) introduce nonwage components in the on-the-job search framework
indicating that alongside wages, other job characteristics might also be important for on-the-job
search. Such characteristics include working time, hours worked, the working environment and
working conditions. Subsequent empirical analysis has confirmed the importance of nonwage job
characteristics in individuals’ decision to change jobs. (e.g. Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Sullivan
and To, 2014; Bonhomme et al., 2015).
We extend the recent on-the-job search model provided by Sullivan and To (2014), which includes
nonwage job characteristics. We incorporate individual risk attitudes in the model to consider a
worker’s uncertainty about the utility of nonwage characteristics when deciding whether or not to
accept a job offer. We display the discounted expected value of lifetime utility for a worker in her
current job as:
Ve(U0) = U + q[Vu − Ve(U0)] + δ[λE max{Ve(U1), Ve(U0)}]. (1)
Unlike the canonical on-the-job search model, the utility from employment U is determined by
the wage w and the utility from nonwage job characteristics ω:
U = g(w,ω) (2)
New job offers arrive at a rate of λ as a random draw (w,ω) from the joint distribution F (w,ω).
Workers decide whether or not to change their job evaluating the discounted expected value of lifetime
utility of the current job Ve(U0) and of the job offer Ve(U1). As in the canonical on-the-job search
model, Vu is the expected utility of unemployment where q is the job destruction rate.
Individuals change their job if the utility level of the offered job is greater than the utility level
of the current job (U1 > U0).
1 In this case, the offer exceeds the reservation utility Ur such that
Ve(U1) ≥ Ve(Ur) (3)
To introduce heterogeneity in risk attitudes in the model we define the parameter pi which mea-
sures an individual’s degree of risk aversion. For ease of presentation, we specify that the individual
having the degree of risk aversion pi1 is more risk averse than the individual with the degree of risk
1 We assume that Ve(U) is strictly increasing in U .
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aversion pi2:
pi1 > pi2, pi1, pi2 ∈ Π (4)
The expected utility of a new job is evaluated differently by individuals according to their risk
aversion. To incorporate risk attitude in the on-the-job search model, we augment the reservation
utility by a risk premium P which depends on the degree of risk aversion pi
Ve(Ur) = Ve(U) + P (pi) (5)
The discounted value of employment for an employed person changes to
Ve(U0) = U + q[Vu − Ve(U0)] + δ[λE maxVe(U1)− P (pi), Ve(U0)}] (6)
Individuals change their job only if the expected utility of the job offer exceeds the expected
utility of their current job by the risk premium P (pi). From this we can derive the exit rate from the
current job:
θ(U0, U1, pi) = λ1[Ve(U1) > Ve(U0) + P (pi)] (7)
Our main hypothesis derived from the theoretical considerations is that more risk-averse individ-
uals change their jobs less often than less risk-averse individuals. In the empirical part of this study,
we explicitly test this hypothesis for individuals in their early career.
Our exploration of the relationship between risk attitudes and job mobility has important implica-
tions for the question as to how job mobility influences wage growth. From a theoretical perspective,
there is disagreement as to whether job-to-job transitions yield positive wage growth. On the one
hand, on-the-job search theory predicts that individuals change their job only if a wage offer exceeds
the wage of their current job. This predicts that job-to-job transitions will result in positive wage
growth (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a). On the other hand, matching models allow the possibility
of negative wage growth (Jovanovic, 1979b). Based on the assumption that the quality of a job match
only reveals itself after an individual has been working in a job for some time, wage growth related
to job-to-job transitions can cease or even be negative.
The introduction of risk attitudes into these models creates several hypotheses on the relationship
between job mobility and wage growth. Firstly, if we assume that the uncertain utility of a job
is related only to the nonwage job characteristics ω, the contracted wage of the new job can be
considered as compensation for this uncertainty.2 Realised wage growth accompanying each job
2 For this argument, we have to make an assumption on the shape of the utility function which in turn determines the
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change should therefore be higher for more risk-averse individuals. This is because they require more
compensation for having chosen a risky alternative than less risk-averse individuals.
Secondly, on the other hand, if we consider wage growth in the current job, the influence of job
mobility in association with risk attitudes is predicted to be negative. As risk-averse individuals are
more reluctant to change their job (θ1(U0, U1, pi1) < θ2(U0, U1, pi2)), they might tolerate less or no
wage growth for a longer time than risk-tolerant individuals.
Modelling the frequency of job changes during individuals’ early career by differences in risk
attitudes, comes with an ambiguous derivation with respect to overall wage growth during that
period. A lower frequency of job changes can lead to higher wage growth due to returns from
accumulated firm-specific capital. On the other hand, the job changing behaviour of more risk-averse
individuals provides fewer opportunities for individuals to learn about their abilities and preferences
by having experienced different jobs. Wage growth for more risk-averse individuals could therefore be
lower, as with each job change the individual can gain returns from information thereby increasing job
match quality via learning (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Antonovics and Golan, 2012; Papageorgiou,
2014).
In view of the ambiguity of the theoretical predictions, we empirically investigate in the following
the relationship between job mobility and wage growth accounting for risk attitudes. On the basis
of the empirical relation between risk attitudes and job mobility, we analyse the influence of risk
attitudes and wage growth associated with each job change as well as the overall wage growth during
the early career.
3 Variable specification and sample construction
The empirical analysis draws on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP). The
SOEP is a representative household panel survey which is conducted on an annual basis (see Wagner
et al. (2007) for details). Our analysis contains individuals observed entering the labour market
in the SOEP since 1992. We consider individuals who entered the labour market as full-time or
regular part-time employees disregarding individuals with student jobs or in other irregular types of
employment. Individuals who were below 18 or above 32 years of age at the time of entry, as well as
those who were self-employed when entering the labour market are excluded from the analysis.
sign of P (pii). If individuals are more or less risk-averse (P (pii) > 0), a certain disutility from facing risks exists for
all individuals and individuals want to be compensated when facing risk. In contrast, it could be that individuals
are more or less risk-tolerant (P (pii) < 0), and hence are to some extent willing to pay for opportunities associated
with higher risks. In the latter case, these would mean in our context that individuals favour risks associated with
a job change. Deciding to change the job because it is associated with higher risks, has been described as job
shopping (Johnson, 1978; McGoldrick and Robst, 1996) or experimenting on job choice (Antonovics and Golan,
2012). Presenting our reasoning we assume that all individuals are more or less risk-averse. The empirical analysis
will test this assumption.
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The first variable of interest is the total number of job changes that individuals experience during
their first seven years in the labour market. The variable is measured using the survey question on
whether respondents have started a new job since the previous interview. Our focus is on voluntary
job changes, i.e. job changes that are initiated by the worker. We focus on voluntary job changes since
there is no clear theoretical prediction on the relationship between risk attitude and involuntary jobs
changes and the subsequent wage growth. We distinguish voluntary from involuntary job changes on
the basis of the unemployment duration which workers experience between jobs, as in Perez and Sanz
(2005) and Pavlopoulos et al. (2014). We consider a job change as voluntary if workers experience a
maximum of three months of unemployment after having left a job.
Alternatively, one can distinguish between voluntary and involuntary job changes based on the
reasons provided by respondents for changing job (Hunt, 2001; Fuller, 2008). The data on the reasons
of job changes unfortunately contains a substantial amount of missing information. We therefore test
the robustness of the results by defining a job change as voluntary if a worker experience a maximum
of three months of unemployment as part of changing job and has changed job for reasons other
than termination of employment by the employer or company closure. Of those changing jobs and
stating the reason for a job change, 18 percent specify “terminated by employer” and “company
closed down” as the reasons for changing job.
Our measure of job change comprises voluntary job changes within and across firms, industries
and/or occupations. The risk associated with changing jobs across firms, industries and/or occupa-
tions is likely to be greater than that associated with job changes within the same firm, industry
and/or occupation. Survey respondents were therefore asked whether they changed jobs within the
same firm or across firms. Of those changing jobs and providing information, 63 percent change to
a new firm and 10 percent stay in the firm. Given the sample size, it is not possible to analyse job
changes within and across firms, industries and occupations separately. Instead we include industry
and occupation fixed effects in all regressions.
The second variable of interest is willingness to take risks. We specifically use willingness to
take risk in occupational matters which was surveyed in the years 2004 and 2009. The variable is
measured on a scale from zero to ten, in which higher values reflect greater willingness to take risks.3
For ease of interpretation, we define a binary risk attitude measure by grouping individuals with risk
attitude below the median as risk-averse, and those with risk attitude above the median as more
risk-tolerant.
3 The exact wording of the question, translated from German, reads: “People can behave differently in different
situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas? How is it in your occupation?
Please give me a number from 0 to 10, where the value 0 means: “Risk-averse” and the value 10 means: “Fully
prepared to take risks”. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.” Dohmen et al. (2011) have shown
that this question is significantly related to paid lottery choices, and explains behaviour in a range of important
domains of real life decisions.
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A recent strand in the literature addresses the stability of individuals’ risk preferences over time
using measures based on subjective assessments and (hypothetical and incentivised) lottery choices
(e.g. Harrison et al. (2005); Sahm (2007); Andersen et al. (2008); Baucells and Villas´ıs (2009);
Reynaud and Couture (2010)). These studies do not find evidence for systematic changes in a
individual’s risk preferences, except in relation to age. Sahm (2007), for example, reports a general
increase in risk aversion with age, but finds that risk preferences are rank-order stable. Dohmen et al.
(2012b) also provide evidence that risk attitudes measured by the survey question which we use in
this study, are generally stable.4
There is no widely accepted concept that captures ‘early career’. Topel and Ward (1992) and
Manning and Swaffield (2008), for example, define early career as the first ten years after labour
market entry. Other studies consider the first five years (Neumark, 2002), seven years (Johnson,
1978) or combinations (Light and McGarry, 1998). We define ‘early career’ as the first seven years
following labour market entry in order to have sufficient incidence of job mobility and number of
observations for the analysis.
Ideally, we use for the empirical analysis a sample of individuals with the same degree of labour
market attachment during the first seven years in the labour market. Therefore we consider only
individuals who were employed at each interview conducted during their first seven years. This
sample contains 280 observations.5 To investigate the sensitivity of our results to sample size, we
construct another sample including also individuals who might be unemployed or out of labour force
at the day the interview is conducted. This sample is less restrictive and contains 1380 observations.
Table B.2 gives a descriptive overview of the differences between both samples. 59 percent of
individuals who are consecutively employed over the first seven years in the labour market change
their job voluntarily at least once. When adding individuals with employment gaps during the first
seven years in the labour market to the sample, the share drops to 37 percent. This could represent a
mechanical effect, because job changes can naturally only be observed when an individual is employed.
Accordingly, the average number of job changes is smaller in the less restrictive sample. However,
the average number of job changes among those who changed their job at least once is roughly
equal between the two samples. In summary, the less restrictive sample is more heterogeneous
concerning the incidence of job changes in early career. Whenever we use the non-restrictive sample
in the following empirical analysis, we therefore include an indicator for an individual’s number of
employment gaps during early career.
Other characteristics depict differences in labour market attachment between the two samples.
4 In our restrictive sample the mean and median differences between reported risk attitude in 2004 and 2009 is 0.60 and
1 respectively. When we define risk attitude as a binary indicator for risk aversion, the mean and median difference
between 2004 and 2009 is zero. This implies that a person’s risk attitude is generally stable over the period of time
relevant for our study.
5 Table B.1 describes the step-by-step sample selection procedure.
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Individuals with employment gaps in the first seven years are less educated, are more likely to hold
a first job in part-time with a temporary contract, have lower tenure and get a lower wage in first
job. However, socio-demographic characteristics and risk aversion are comparable between the two
samples.
4 Results
4.1 The influence of risk attitudes on voluntary job changes
In a first step we want to clarify whether there is a significant relationship between risk attitudes and
the number of job changes an individuals makes in her early career. Our conceptual framework pos-
tulates that risk-averse individuals change jobs less often than risk-tolerant individuals. Descriptive
evidence indeed shows that the group of risk-averse individuals change jobs voluntarily on average
0.69 times during the first seven years in the labour market whereas risk-tolerant individuals change
jobs voluntarily on average one time. This result is visualised in Figure 1 depicting differences in the
average number of voluntary job changes between the group of risk-averse and risk-tolerant individ-
uals over the first seven years. The gap in the number of job changes between both groups widens
with the years of potential experience in the labour market increasing.
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Figure 1: Average number of voluntary job changes during the early career by level of risk aversion.
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To examine the significance of the relationship between risk attitudes and job mobility during
the early career we use the following econometric specification:
TJCi = α0 + α1RAi + δXi + µi (8)
TJCi is the total number of voluntary job changes during the first seven years in the labour
market. RAi is a binary measure of risk attitude which takes the value one if individual i ’s risk
attitude is below the median of the distribution. Xi includes other control variables which we will
discuss below. µi is an error term. The coefficient of interest is α1 which indicates the influence of
risk attitude on the total number of voluntary job changes.
We use an OLS regression to estimate equation (8). α1 gives a consistent estimate of the effect
of risk attitude on the number of voluntary job changes under the assumption that risk attitude is
uncorrelated with µi. Therefore, Xi includes various variables which are related to risk attitudes
and at the same might influence job changing behaviour. This rules out that there any unobserved
factors left which determine the relationship between risk attitudes and job changing behaviour and
supports the causal interpretation of the estimation results.
First, individuals who experience a good match in their first job, in terms of productivity and
preferences, are less likely to change jobs than individuals who experience a bad match. To rule out
the possibility that job match systematically differs between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals,
we also control for the wage and job satisfaction in the first job. In addition, we include the type
of contract (temporary or permanent), the type of employment (part-time or full-time), previous
experience within the firm and the size of the firm on labour market entry in the regression.
Second, previous studies have shown that individuals with higher levels of risk tolerance invest
more in human capital (Brown and Taylor, 2005; Budria et al., 2012), and choose occupations with
higher earnings variance (Bonin et al., 2007; Skriabikova et al., 2013) whereas risk-averse individuals
are more likely to choose employment positions in the public sector (Pfeifer, 2010). We account
for these differences by including the highest educational degree obtained and the following factors
describing initial sorting: whether one is employed in the public or private sector, the occupation-
specific earnings variance at the 2-digit level as well as occupation and industry fixed effects at the
1-digit level for the first job.
Third, risk attitudes can be transmitted from parents to their children (Dohmen et al., 2012a;
Necker and Voskort, 2014). At the same time, the family background can affect the job changing
behaviour, for example by providing job opportunities. Furthermore, individuals with a wealthy
family background might evaluate job changing decisions as less risky than individuals with poorer
family background. We therefore use the level of paternal education and parents’ occupations to
9
control for the intergenerational link of risk attitudes and the possibility that family background
influences job changing behaviour.
Overall, the result is in line with our theoretical prediction supporting the proposition that risk-
averse individuals make fewer number of voluntary job changes than risk-tolerant individuals. In
Table 1, column (1), the simple correlation between risk attitude and the number of job changes is
displayed. The coefficient on risk attitude is negative and remains significant when we add control
variables for basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics, family background as well as year
dummies in column (2).
The coefficient on risk attitude also remains negative when we include control variables describing
initial match quality and initial sorting in columns (3), (4) and (5). For example, adding fixed effects
at the 1-digit level for the industry and occupation in the first job on labour market entry job does not
change the significance of the estimated coefficient on risk attitude. This implies that risk attitude
is significant for voluntary job changes within as well as across industries and occupations.
The magnitude of the effect of risk attitude in column (5) can be interpreted the following way:
Being risk-averse in occupational matters reduces the average number of job change made during the
first seven years in the labour market by 0.276, which is one third of a standard deviation.6
Other variables do not play a role in explaining the number of job changes during early career
except for the wage level in the first job. The higher the wage in the first job the lower is the
number of job changes during early career, which holds across all specifications. This result is in
line with the theoretical literature on job-search models. Individuals change jobs only if the offered
wage associated with a new job is high enough compared to the wage level in the current job. Our
result therefore shows that risk attitudes explain job changing behaviour in addition to the level of
the reservation wage.
6 As robustness checks we run a Poisson regression to account for the distribution of the dependent variable which
can only take on integer values from zero to seven. We also estimate an ordered logit model specifying a job change
variable with categories for no job change, one job change, two or more job changes. In both cases risk-averse
individuals change significantly less often their jobs during early career.
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Table 1: The influence of risk attitude on total number of job changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if Risk-averse -0.224∗∗ -0.246∗∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.262∗∗ -0.276∗∗
(0.099) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.109)
1 if Male -0.098 -0.089 -0.065 -0.068
(0.101) (0.111) (0.112) (0.125)
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.055 0.021 0.042 -0.029
(0.126) (0.123) (0.126) (0.126)
1 if German national 0.213 0.134 0.154 0.074
(0.139) (0.172) (0.184) (0.189)
1 if Low or no educational degree 0.016 -0.002 -0.075 -0.013
(0.214) (0.231) (0.231) (0.223)
1 if Tertiary educational degree 0.249 0.226 0.246 0.090
(0.154) (0.169) (0.176) (0.214)
Age starting first job -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Wage in first job -0.253∗ -0.243∗ -0.244∗
(0.141) (0.136) (0.134)
Job satisfaction in first job -0.031 -0.029 -0.032
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
1 if First job in public sector -0.016 0.036 -0.038
(0.126) (0.144) (0.150)
1 if Permanent contract in first job -0.066 -0.110 -0.117
(0.113) (0.118) (0.121)
1 if Part-time employment in first job 0.004 -0.069 -0.074
(0.163) (0.156) (0.156)
Tenure in first job -0.052 -0.044 -0.047
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Wage variance within occ. of first job -0.311 -0.643 -0.034
(0.757) (0.197) (1.034)
Constant 0.912∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 3.657∗∗∗ 3.872∗∗∗ 3.893∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.485) (1.239) (1.200) (1.342)
Year dummies
√ √ √ √
Parental background
√ √ √ √
Industry dummies and firm size
√ √
Occupation dummies
√
R-squared 0.017 0.041 0.113 0.141 0.182
Sample 280 280 280 280 280
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. Dependent variable: total number of job changes during the first seven years
in the labour market.
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels.
Table 2 provides estimation results for three robustness checks. Overall, the estimation results
show that the effect of risk attitude remains negative and statistically significant. We examine the
sensitivity of the results to sample size displaying results in columns (1) and (2). The estimations are
based on the less restrictive sampling criteria which allows employment gaps during the first seven
years. In columns (3) and (4), we show the estimation results when we additionally use information
on the reasons for job changes as stated by respondents to define voluntary job change.
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Table 2: The influence of risk attitude on total number of job changes: Robustness checks
Non-restrictive Alternative definition of Labour market entry
sample voluntary job change after 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if Risk-averse -0.103∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗ -0.366∗∗
(0.040) (0.036) (0.095) (0.102) (0.127) (0.156)
1 if Male 0.073∗ -0.053 -0.172
(0.044) (0.128) (0.152)
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.009 -0.014 -0.052
(0.042) (0.132) (0.122)
1 if German national 0.156∗∗ -0.034 0.122
(0.066) (0.185) (0.281)
1 if Low or no educational degree 0.001 0.003 0.260
(0.052) (0.235) (0.308)
1 if Tertiary educational degree 0.117∗ -0.024 0.015
(0.065) (0.189) (0.272)
Age starting first job -0.017∗∗ -0.015 0.006
(0.008) (0.022) (0.034)
Wage in first job -0.123∗∗∗ -0.254∗ -0.125
(0.035) (0.136) (0.174)
Job satisfaction in first job -0.019∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.059∗
(0.009) (0.025) (0.034)
1 if First job in public sector -0.075 -0.025 0.026
(0.055) (0.142) (0.171)
1 if Permanent contract in first job -0.037 -0.123 -0.262
(0.040) (0.114) (0.159)
1 if Part-time employment in first job -0.114∗∗ -0.090 -0.098
(0.049) (0.152) (0.208)
Tenure in first job -0.037∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.013
(0.014) (0.043) (0.051)
Wage variance within occ. of first job 0.758∗∗ 0.250 -0.820
(0.312) (1.094) (1.510)
Constant 0.538∗∗∗ 2.049∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 3.503∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 3.024
(0.028) (0.351) (0.068) (1.423) (0.086) (1.875)
Year dummies
√ √ √
Parental background
√ √ √
Industry dummies and firm size
√ √ √
Occupation dummies
√ √ √
Employment gap dummies
√ √
R-squared 0.005 0.242 0.029 0.235 0.031 0.313
Sample 1370 1370 257 257 166 166
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. Dependent variable: total number of job changes during the first seven years
in the labour market.
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
Finally, one might raise the concern that reverse causality produces a biased estimated of the
coefficient on risk attitudes. It could be that individuals change their attitudes as a result of a job
change rather than the other way around. Given that descriptive figures in section 3 show that risk
attitudes in our sample are stable over time, we argue that this is of little concern. Yet, our sample
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includes some individuals who entered the labour market already in 1992. The survey question on
risk attitudes was asked for the first time in 2004. We might therefore fail to observe adjustments in
risk attitudes through the years 1992 to 2004 which could include a reversed causal direction of job
changes affecting risk attitudes. To reduce that problem we use a sample of individuals who entered
the labour market in the year 2000 or later in column (5). As a result, there are no changes to the
main results in Table 1.
4.2 Risk attitude, job changes and wage growth
In the conceptual framework in section 2 we discuss three potential links between risk attitudes and
wage growth associated with job changes. Firstly, risk-averse individuals demand a higher wage as
compensation for the risk when they change job than risk-tolerant individuals. Secondly, risk-averse
individuals are less likely to change their job than risk-tolerant individuals, given a constant job offer
rate. Risk-averse individuals might therefore experience little or no wage growth in their current
job for a longer period of time without changing jobs than more risk-tolerant individuals. Thirdly,
risk-averse individuals change jobs less frequently during early career than risk-tolerant individuals
and thus spend more years with the same firm. In terms of overall wage growth over the early
career, risk-averse individuals might therefore obtain higher average returns to accumulated tenure.
Changing jobs less frequently, risk-averse individuals may, on the other hand, receive less returns
to information regarding the match between her preferences or abilities and job requirements than
risk-tolerant individuals.
The described mechanisms propose an ambiguous relationship between risk attitudes and wage
growth associated with job changes. Unfortunately, it is not possible to fully disentangle the three
mechanisms in the empirical analysis. Yet, we are able to distinguish between the wage growth
associated with each job change and overall wage growth as a result of the early career.
We therefore divide our empirical analysis on wage growth in two parts in order to examine
the proposed mechanisms. In the first part, we apply the following wage growth equation in order
to investigate whether wage gains accompanied by a voluntary job change are different between
risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals:
lnWit = β0 + β1JCit ×RAi + θZit + it (9)
lnWit is the log of real hourly wage at time t. JCi is an indicator variable for making a volun-
tary job change. We interact this variable with the binary, person-specific indicator for the attitude
towards risks RAi. Zit includes time-variant individual and firm-level characteristics such as work
experience, tenure, firm size, industry and occupation dummies. We estimate the wage growth equa-
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tion applying a fixed effect panel estimator. The advantage of the estimator is that any influence
from time-invariant unobservable characteristics on voluntary job changes is removed without im-
posing any assumptions on the econometric specification.7 We confine the estimation of equation
(9) to individuals who voluntarily change job at least once during the first seven years in the labour
market, in order to observe a homogenous group of individuals concerning job changing behaviour
(cf. Bono and Vuri (2011)).
In the second part we examine whether overall wage growth related to job changing behaviour
during early career is different between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals. For this purpose we
estimate the following wage equation:
ln∆Wi = β0 + β1TJCi ×RAi + λQi + i (10)
ln∆Wt is the log of the real hourly wage difference between the first and seventh year in the labour
market measuring overall wage growth during early career. TJCi is the number of job changes made
voluntarily during early career interacted with the binary, person-specific indicator for the attitude
towards risks RAi. Qi includes demographic characteristics and variables representing parental back-
ground. These are variables which are determined previous to labour market entry. We do not include
variables which are results of decisions taken while being in the labour market, such as characteris-
tics of the first or the current job. This is because the simultaneous determination of (job choice)
decisions and wage level could lead to biased estimations results.8
Table 3 presents the influence of risk attitudes on wage growth when changing the job. On
average each voluntary job change is associated with a significant positive increase in log hourly
real wages, irrespective of using the restrictive sample (columns (1) and (2)) or the non-restrictive
sample (columns (3) and (4)). However, we only find a weakly significant difference in wage growth
associated with a job change between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals when we use the non-
restrictive sample. Risk-averse individuals have on average higher wage growth when they change
their job than risk-tolerant individuals.
Differences between the estimation results based on the restrictive sample and based on the non-
restrictive sample (Table 3) can, in this case, exist for two reasons: Firstly, the fixed effects panel
estimator exploits the variation over time within each cross section and thus is relatively imprecise
when regressors vary little over time. Although there is no difference in the shares of risk-averse
and risk-tolerant individuals between both samples, the variation (over time) in job changes during
the early career is higher in the non-restrictive sample (see descriptive statistics in Table B.2). This
7 Time-invariant unobservable characteristics might be in particular initial conditions when starting the career, sorting
into specific jobs and parental background.
8 Angrist and Pischke (2009) discuss this problem under the term ‘bad controls’. Including explanatory variables which
might also represent dependent variables in the notional estimation specification leads to biased estimates.
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goes in hand with the fact that in the estimation based on the restrictive sample less of the variation
across individuals is explained than in the estimation based on the non-restrictive sample.
Table 3: Influence of risk attitudes on the relationship between job change and wage growth
Restrictive Sample Non-restrictive Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Voluntary JC 0.049∗ 0.045∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
1 if Voluntary JC risk-averse 0.011 0.022 0.055 0.05∗
(0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.03)
Experience 0.090∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Experience square -0.003∗∗ -0.02∗
(0.001) (0.01)
Tenure 0.004 0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Occupation dummies
√ √
Industry dummies
√ √
Within R-squared 0.006 0.311 0.021 0.230
Between R-squared 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.180
Overall R-squared 0.002 0.103 0.001 0.196
Observations (person) 165 504
Observations (person*year) 1155 2608
Source: SOEP 1992-2013. Sample: Labour market entrants (aged 18-32 at the time of entry) during their first seven years in
the labour market.
Notes: Estimation Method: Fixed Effects Panel Estimation. Dependent variable: Monthly real wage. Model: Fixed effect
regression. Sample only contains job changers. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10 levels.
Secondly, it could be that the composition of individuals in the two samples are not comparable
when it comes to measuring wage differences. The descriptive figures in Table B.2 indicate that
there are differences in labour attachment such that individuals in the non-restrictive sample are
less educated, have lower tenure and less favourable conditions in the first job. Yet those differences
should reflect an individuals time-invariant capability to be successful on the labour market which
is accounted for by the estimation technique independent of the sample composition. Note also that
we do not find any structural differences in the relationship between risk attitudes and job changing
behaviour using either the restrictive or the non-restrictive sample (see Section 4.1).
We therefore conclude that differences in the estimation results can be ascribed to insufficient
variation (or insufficient sample size) of the restrictive sample but not to differences in the composition
between the two samples. Hence, in summary, we find that risk-averse individuals tend to obtain on
average higher wage growth with each job change made.
Table 4 presents evidence pertaining to the influence of risk attitudes on the difference in overall
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wage growth related to job changing behaviour. We aim at answering the question whether the
difference in the number of job changes between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals results in
different overall wage growth after seven years in the labour market.
Table 4: Influence of risk attitudes on the relationship between job change and overall wage growth
Restrictive Sample Non-restrictive Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if Risk-averse -0.046 -0.077 -0.062 -0.040 -0.040 -0.039
(0.064) (0.072) (0.074) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
No. of job changes 0.033 0.043 0.038 0.051** 0.045* 0.041
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Risk-averse*No. job changes 0.111* 0.120* 0.105 0.087** 0.079* 0.080*
(0.065) (0.070) (0.071) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
1 if Male -0.019 -0.016 0.026 0.028
(0.048) (0.050) (0.027) (0.027)
1 if Originates from West Germany 0.084 0.064 0.052 0.040
(0.074) (0.076) (0.032) (0.033)
1 if German national 0.018 0.011 0.092** 0.068
(0.072) (0.080) (0.042) (0.043)
1 if Low or no educational degree -0.107 -0.110* -0.006 -0.002
(0.067) (0.063) (0.040) (0.040)
1 if Tertiary educational degree -0.020 -0.034 0.017 -0.008
(0.082) (0.086) (0.042) (0.043)
Age starting first job 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.340*** -0.132 0.047 0.330*** 0.042 0.136
(0.043) (0.304) (0.318) (0.032) (0.211) (0.217)
Year dummies
√ √ √ √
Parental background
√ √
Employment gap dummies
√ √ √
R-squared 0.032 0.089 0.111 0.096 0.113 0.127
Sample 280 280 280 1370 1370 1370
Source: SOEP. Sample: labour market entrants. Dependent variable: over all wage growth measures as the difference between
the wage in the job held in the seventh year after entering the labour market and the wage in the first job.
Notes: Estimation Method: OLS. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
We find that the patterns of job mobility (measured by the number of job changes during early
career) lead to weakly significant difference in overall wage growth for risk-averse and risk-tolerant
individuals. Overall, risk-averse individuals tend to obtain higher overall wage growth through their
job changing behaviour. Interestingly, the base effect of risk attitudes (partialling out the number of
job changes) shows no significant influence on overall wage growth throughout the specifications. As
a tentative conclusion from this finding, job mobility can be considered the channel through which
risk attitudes influence wage growth.
To sum up our empirical results, risk-averse individuals change their jobs less often during early
career. If they change their job, they tend to obtain on average higher wage growth accompanied
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with the job change. Overall risk-averse individuals end up with moderate higher wage growth during
early career. This last result could be interpreted in the way that risk-averse individuals manage to
obtain higher wage gains from the joint decision of how many times to change the job and which job
to take (with respect to wages).
5 Conclusion
Deciding to change the job is risky because it entails significant costs while benefits cannot be entirely
foreseen. In this study, we therefore present a theoretical model on the relationship between risk
attitudes and job mobility. According to the theoretical prediction, the more risk-averse individuals
are the less likely they change their job. Subsequently, we propose that the relationship between risk
attitudes and job mobility is responsible for different patterns in wage growth during early career.
Using SOEP data we indeed find that risk-averse individuals change their jobs significantly less often
during early career. Furthermore, wage growth associated with each job change tends to be higher
for risk-averse individuals than for risk-tolerant individuals. Lastly, overall wage growth measured
by the difference between the wage level in the first job and in the job held after seven years in the
labour market moderately differs between risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals. The job changing
behaviour during early career leads to higher wage growth for risk-averse individuals. A number of
sensitivity tests including sample composition, econometric specification and measurement of risk
attitudes confirm the robustness of our main findings.
Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the influence of risk attitudes as an individ-
ual’s productivity trait on wage growth. While risk attitudes can influence wage growth through the
decision to invest in human capital (Shaw, 1996) or through the decision for an occupational environ-
ment with specific wage structure (Bonin et al., 2007; Skriabikova et al., 2014), we find some evidence
that risk attitudes matter for wage growth through mobility decisions. Our empirical findings are
therefore relevant for labour market research which studies groups with pronounced differences in risk
attitudes. For instance, empirical evidence shows that there is heterogeneity in willingness to take
risks between men and women (Dohmen et al., 2011) as well as between native and migrants (Bonin
et al., 2009). Our finding that risk attitude is a crucial behavioural trait that influences individuals’
job mobility decisions can help to explain existing wage gaps between those groups.
Our measure of job changes may not comprise all the risks inherent to job changes. In particular,
some job changes in our sample might have been job changes within the same firm, which entails
less uncertainty than a job change to another employer. Job mobility in our analysis might therefore
overestimate the associated risks. Our estimates of the effect of risk attitude on job mobility and the
subsequent wage growth can thus be considered a lower bound.
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For future research it would be interesting to disentangle the antagonising effects of job-specific
human capital accumulation and of improvement in match quality through job changes, and to
examine their role for differences in early career wage growth. We do not find a significant difference
between the two groups of risk-averse and risk-tolerant individuals with respect to the timing of
job changes which determines job tenure. To further investigate returns to tenure and returns to
information on match quality, data with information on wages and job changes on a monthly basis
is needed.
It would also be interesting for future work to investigate the influence of risk attitude on job
search intensity and to consider the resulting heterogeneity in wage growth. Job search intensity or
job mobility intentions may also be related to risk attitudes as the costs and benefits of on-the-job
search are similarly uncertain for individuals than it applies to actual job changes.
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B Appendix
Table B.1: Sample selection procedure
Respondents Steps of sample selection
4077 Labour market entrants in SOEP sample starting from 1992
−1428 not employed full-time or regular part-time in first job
2649
−95 not between 18 and 32 years of age when starting first job
2554
−52 self-employed in first job
2502
−907 missing data on risk attitudes
1595
−225 missing data on control variables
1370 Non-restrictive sample
−1090 not consecutively employed during the first seven years after labour market entry
280 Restrictive sample
Source: SOEP 1992-2013
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics
Restrictive sample Nonrestrictive sample
(1) (2)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
1 if at least one job change 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1
Number of job changes 0.83 0.84 0 4 0.49 0.75 0 4
Number of job changes (at least one) 1.40 0.62 1 4 1.34 0.61 1 4
Risk attitude 4.85 2.42 0 10 4.52 2.43 0 10
1 if Risk-averse 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
1 if Male 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0 1
1 if living in West Germany 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.73 0.44 0 1
1 if German nationality 0.89 0.32 0 1 0.89 0.31 0 1
Degree (Intermediate degree)
1 if Low or no educational degree 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
1 if Tertiary educational degree 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1
Age starting first job 23.58 3.15 19 32 23.31 3.05 18 32
Job satisfaction in first job 7.42 1.94 1 10 7.24 1.98 0 10
1 if First job in public sector 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
1 if Permanent contract in first job 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
1 if Part-time employment in first job 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1
Tenure in first job 1.58 1.48 0.0 6.6 1.37 1.36 0.0 6.60
Wage variation within occ. in first job 0.51 0.09 0.2 0.7 0.54 0.09 0.19 0.84
Log of monthly wage in first job 7.22 0.44 5.63 8.22 7.00 0.61 4.54 8.40
Observations 280 1370
Notes: SD stands for standard deviation. Sample: Labour market entrants (aged 18-32 at the time of entry) during their first
seven years.
Source: SOEP 1992-2013.
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